Editor's note: Thomas Hegghammer is director of terrorism research at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment and author of "Jihad in Saudi Arabia: Violence and Pan-Islamism since 1979." The views expressed are solely those of the author.
How big a threat do foreign fighters in
Syria and Iraq pose to the West? It's a question that has been much on
the mind of policymakers and commentators, especially since U.S.
President Barack Obama announced the United States was ramping up its
military role in the region. Will such fighters return with dangerous
new skills and experience that they are determined to use against their
home country? Or is the potential threat by these fighters overhyped?
The answer depends on
what the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria decides to do with them. So
far, jihadi groups in Syria have not been sending foreign fighters on
attack missions in the West in any sort of systematic way. But if the
group decides to "weaponize" its fighters, we will have a much bigger
problem on our hands.
Thomas Hegghammer
Since 2011, around 3,000
Western Muslims have gone to Syria, where many have joined the most
radical elements of the insurgency. And there is no question that some
of these individuals will pose a terrorist threat when they return. We
know this because it has already happened -- Syria veterans are
suspected of involvement in one successful and at least six unsuccessful alleged attacks in Europe and Australia over the past year.
Yet there is no reason to expect all -- or even a majority -- of these people to try to attack us in the future. During my research,
I have found that of all Western Muslims who joined conflict zones
before 2011, no more than one in nine moved on to terrorism in the West.
In fact, this estimate is probably at the high end -- the real
historical average may be closer to one in 15 or 20.
This suggests that the
more helpful question is therefore not whether the foreign fighters in
Syria are a threat, but what proportion of them will be.
Can we not simply assume
that somewhere between one in nine or one in 20 of the fighters in Syria
will become terrorists, and try to plan accordingly? Unfortunately,
it's not that simple because the "blowback rate" -- the proportion of
outgoing fighters who later return to attack -- varies significantly
between destinations.
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Take the conflict in
Somalia, for example, which attracted hundreds of Western foreign
fighters in the previous decade, but produced few attacking returnees.
In contrast, of those who went to Afghanistan and Pakistan in the same
period, a substantial proportion plotted attacks on their return.
So, how can we determine
whether Syria will produce foreign fighters that are more like Somalia
or more like Afghanistan and Pakistan in terms of blowback?
It largely depends on
whether you have a group in the theater of conflict that strategically
targets the West. For example, the Afghanistan-Pakistan area has a high
blowback rate because it is home to the so-called al Qaeda Central, a
group whose sole preoccupation is to mount attacks in the West. Al Qaeda
excelled at taking foreign fighters who had come to fight with the
Taliban and persuading them to undertake attacks in Europe or the United
States instead.
Most other jihadi
groups, even al Qaeda's own affiliates, are not equally invested in this
strategy. True, they all spout anti-American rhetoric and may even
dabble in anti-Western extremist actions. But they invest the bulk of
their resources in local operations.
And so far, that has
been true of ISIS, too. Of course, if you look for anti-Western
statements and links to potential international plots, you will find
them. But these indications actually make up a small proportion of the
group's overall ideological production and military operations. The fact
is that there is little to suggest that ISIS has had a sustained and
centrally directed global operations program.
This is one of the
reasons why the blowback rate from Syria has so far been low, several
plots notwithstanding. Six plots involving a total of, say, 10 or 20
Syria veterans make for a blowback rate of one in 150 or one in 300.
Yes, it is still early in the conflict, and several plots may have gone
unreported. But Syria is still looking like a low blowback foreign
fighter destination.
There is, however, the
question of whether Western intervention in Iraq and Syria will cause
ISIS to go global. Certainly, the group has taken a more anti-Western
posture over the past few months. It has repeatedly threatened to attack the United States, and it has beheaded American hostages in Syria.
In a noteworthy statement,
for example, ISIS spokesman Abu Muhammad al-Adnani recently called on
supporters worldwide to attack members of the coalition in any way
possible. So we should not be surprised if ISIS embarks on a limited but
sustained external operations effort, along the lines of al Qaeda in
the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen, which combines a primarily local agenda
with a small global side operation.
Ultimately, though, ISIS
is unlikely to go all in on global operations the way al Qaeda Central
has. The organization is not designed for that, and such a strategy is
not compatible with its state-building ambitions. Besides, ISIS' threats
have so far differed in tone from those of al Qaeda Central. Where the
latter says, in effect, that "we're coming at you regardless," ISIS has
basically been saying, "We'll come at you if you attack us." It's a
somewhat more reluctant declaration of war.
None of this is to
suggest that some foreign fighters in Syria won't come back and do bad
things regardless of what ISIS' leaders choose to do -- they undoubtedly
will. And it is also important to remember one more thing, namely that
although the early signs suggest that the threat from foreign fighters
returning is low, the potential for attacks is still there.
Indeed, if ISIS starts
to "weaponize" its Western recruits in a strategic way, then the foreign
fighter threat will take on a more significant -- and more deadly --
complexion than it has so far.
source>>>CNN